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Controlling
Motion Picture Piracy:
the Seemingly Endless Supply of
Counterfeit Optical Discs in Taiwan
ABSTRACT

Annually, Hollywood loses roughly $3.5 billion dollars in
revenue to optical disc piracy in Taiwan. Optical disc piracy
involves the camcordingor copying of motion pictures onto laser
discs, digital versatile discs, or video compact discs. Through
the U.S. Trade Representative's satellite enforcement offices in
Taiwan and coordination with the Taiwanese legislature and
enforcement agencies, the U.S. motion picture companies have
been able to influence some change in the frequency and severity
of optical disc piracy in Taiwan. This can be mainly attributed
to the Motion PictureAssociation of America's alliance with the
U.S. Trade Representative in placing Taiwan on numerous
"Special 301" lists, which can have a negative effect on the
Taiwan's trade relationship with the United States, public
image, and ability to attract foreign investors. The reduction of
optical disc piracy in Taiwan is impeded by accession to the
World Trade Organization, cultural hurdles, weak domestic
film industry and self interest. Nevertheless, U.S. Copyright
industries can still influence change externally, by continued
pressure under "Special 301"; and, internally, by incentivizing
building relationships with
Taiwan businesses and
property
intellectual
and
independent
governmental
organizations.
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MOTION PICTURE PIRACY IN TAIWAN

I. INTRODUCTION

Piracy is "the unauthorized taking, copying or use of copyrighted
materials without the authorization of the" copyright owner.1
The
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)2 reports that
Hollywood lost $3.5 billion in revenue to piracy in 2002. 3 This does
not include revenues lost by non-major studios or through internet
4
piracy, which are difficult to track.
Optical disc piracy involves the illegal copying of motion pictures
onto an optical disc, a term which encompasses laser discs, digital
versatile discs (DVDs), 5 and video compact discs (VCDs), 6 a lower
quality optical disc format popular in Asia. 7 Pirates may "copy
''8
movies by cracking the digital copyright codes built into DVDs.
They may also camcord motion pictures 9 obtained from industry
screening copies and film prints sent to theatres, often before the

1.
RespectCopyrights.org, What is Piracy?, http:/respectcopyrights.org (last
visited Feb. 12, 2006).
2.
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) serves as the
representative for the U.S. motion picture industry. See MPAA, 2003 FULL TEN
COUNTRY PIRAcY FACT SHEET 1 (2003) (on file with VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.)
[hereinafter 2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET]. "MPAA" will also refer to
the Motion Picture Association of America's international arm, the Motion Picture
Association, often referred to as the MPA.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
The DVD is a commonly used medium for digital video. Peter Moore, Steal
This Disk: Copy Protection, Consumer's Rights, and the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1438 n.9 (2003). It is "a superior alternative to VHS
videotapes or laserdiscs." Id. The DVD is a "5.25-inch optical disk[ ], very similar in
appearance to CDs." Id. It "can store much more data [including] a full-length motion
picture . . . , something never before possible. Although laserdiscs were available
before DVDs, the disks were physically large and the medium was analog." Id.
6.
"[VCD] technology was developed by Sony and Philips in 1993, and allows
around 70 minutes of compressed MPEG-1 video/audio to be stored on a CD." Monster
ISP, VCD Definition, http://www.monster-isp.com/glossary/VCD.html (last visited Feb.
12, 2006). 'Typically VCD movies are (copied onto] two CDs. VCDs were very popular
in Asia, and were available before DVD." Id. However, "VCDs will probably eventually
succumb to the higher quality of DVD." Id.
7.
See David Spark, Telling Tales of DVD Piracy (May 1, 2003),
http://www.emedialive.com/ArticlesfReadArticle.aspx?CategoryID-44&ArticlelD=5094
(discussing DVD piracy); Repectcopyrights.org, Optical Disc and Videocassette Piracy,
http://respectcopyrights.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
8.
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Movie Pirates Go Mobile, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 25,
2003, at 44, 44.
9.
This is when a pirate uses a "hand-held video camera to record the film
directly from the screen." Brent T. Yonehara, Note, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO
Accession, Film Piracy and Prospects for Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 12 DEPAULLCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 63, 68 (2002). This is also known as camcorder piracy.
MPAA, Theatrical Camcorder Piracy, http://www.mpaa.org/piracy theatrical-cam.asp
[hereinafter Theatrical Camcorder Piracy].
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movie is released to the public. 10 Fifty major movie titles were stolen
by camcorder recording prior to their U.S. theatrical release between
May 2002 and May 2003.11
With pirated disc production from Taiwan found all over the
world 12 and estimated annual motion picture piracy losses of
$67.8 million in 2005,13 the MPAA is greatly interested in reducing
optical disc piracy in Taiwan. Internationally, the MPAA exerts
pressure on the Taiwanese government to increase Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) enforcement and penalties. 14 Domestically, the
MPAA lobbies Congress and also influences the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) to pressure Taiwan into increasing copyright
legislation and enforcement under "Special 301."'15 It also aids in
16
anti-piracy enforcement in Taiwan.
Through "Special 301," the USTR identifies countries that have
problematic IPR protection policies or restrict market access to U.S.
intellectual property. 17 Recognition by the USTR harms a country's
international reputation and discourages foreign investment; 18
additionally, such recognition may lead to trade sanctions. 19 Until
recently, Taiwan has spent the previous four years on the USTR's
Priority Watch List, the second most severe designation under
"Special 301. '' 20 Despite the efforts of the MPAA and the USTR,

10.
Theatrical Camcorder Piracy, supra note 9.
11.
Id.
12.
SHUJEN WANG, FRAMING PIRACY: GLOBALIZATION AND FILM DISTRIBUTION
IN GREATER CHINA 157-58 (Rowman & Littlefield 2003).
13.
2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supranote 2, at 23.
14.
Bill Heaney, Software Industry Walks Copyright Tightrope, TAIPEI TIMES,
May 8, 2003, at 11, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2003/
05108/205167 [hereinafter Heaney, Software Industry Walks Copyright Tightrope].
15.
See Int'l Intell. Prop. Alliance (IIPA), Member Associations, http://iipa.coml
memberassociations.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (noting that the MPAA is a
member of the International Intellectual Property Alliance) [hereinafter Member
Associations]; IIPA, Description of the IIPA, http://iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2006) (discussing IIPA involvement in "Special 301") [hereinafter Description
of the IIPA].
16.
See 2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 1
(noting the MPAA's international piracy efforts).
17.
JEAN HEILMAN GRIER, SECTION 301 OF THE 1974 TRADE ACT § IV (2005),
http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/301.html.
18.
See Bill Heaney, Seizures of Fake Discs Rise in Asia, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 4,
2004, at 10, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2004/02/
04/2003097440 [hereinafter Heaney, Seizures of Fake Discs Rise in Asia]; International
Development-Taiwan Amends Copyright Law, 15(10) J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 22, 23
(2003).
19.
Facts and Figures, The U.S. Special 301 Process, 3(3) ECON. PERSP. 32, 32
(1998), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0598/ijee/ijee0598.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2006).
20.
IIPA, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON GLOBAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT app. d at 3 (2004) (covering Taiwan's "Special 301" list placement up to
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Taiwan still finds itself on the USTR's Watch List. 21 Taiwan's
continued listing, although now with a better designation, suggests
that many IPR problems remain and may raise doubts concerning the
ability of U.S. copyright industries and their affiliates to influence
large scale IPR change in Taiwan.
This Note will focus on optical disc piracy in Taiwan generally
from the perspective of the U.S. motion picture industry. 22 Part II of
this Note provides a background on the motion picture industry and
optical disc piracy.
Part III describes the MPAA's role in
strengthening copyright law and enforcement in Taiwan, directly and
through other entities such as the International Intellectual Property
Association (IIPA) 23 and the USTR. Part IV describes Taiwan's
history of being on the USTR's "Special 301" lists, the concessions
that have followed, and the MPAA's current demands for IPR
protection in Taiwan. Finally, Part V discusses the reasons why
Taiwan may or may not concede to the motion picture industry's
demands and recommends an approach for the motion picture
industry to reduce optical disc piracy through the strengthening of
copyright law and enforcement in Taiwan.

II. OPTICAL DISC PIRACY
A. Optical Disc Piracy
1. Moviemaking: A "Hit or Miss" Industry
Moviemaking is a very "risky business."2 4 "[O]nly one out of ten
films recoups its investment from domestic exhibition. '25 Four out of

2003) [hereinafter 2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301 REPORT]; USTR, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT
20 (2004) (placing Taiwan on the 2004 "Priority Watch List"), [hereinafter 2004 USTR
SPECIAL 301 REPORT].

21.
See USTR, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 47 (2005) (placing Taiwan on the
2005 "Watch List") [hereinafter 2005 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT].
22.
Although, many MPAA actions ultimately involve the USTR, this Note does
not seek to focus on international trade law.
23.
The IIPA is a "coalition formed in 1984 to represent the U.S. copyright.
based industries in bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve international
protection of copyrighted materials." Description of the IIPA, supra note 15. The "IIPA
is comprised of seven trade associations, each representing a significant segment of the
U.S. copyright community [and a total of] 1900 U.S. companies." Id. One of these
associations is the MPAA. See Member Associations, supra note 15.
24.

MPAA, ANTI-PIRACY,

WHO PIRACY HURTS,

ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY,

http://www.mpaa.org/piracy-EntInd.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ANTIPIRACY].

25.

Id.
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ten "never recoup [their] original investment." 26 The average film
costs over $98 million to produce and advertise. 27 To recoup this cost,
the motion picture "industry relies [on] a ...sequential release of the
movie." 28 First, the film is theatrically released, then to home video,
then to video on demand, then to pay per view, then to pay television,
then to terrestrial television, and then to syndication. 29 This release
sequence provides the best financial return for studios, but also
"provides consumers with choices as to how they wish to view movies
30
and when."
Piracy affects all stages of the release sequence. 31 When film
piracy occurs, it negatively affects subsequent markets for each
interval in the release sequence. 32 For example, retailers cannot
compete fairly with pirate businesses that do not have the typical
33
expenses associated with the cost of doing legitimate business.
Further, pirates siphon away revenue from studios that invest in the
34
film, distributors, and foreign and local filmmakers.
2. Growing Optical Disc Piracy
Optical disc piracy 'obliterates the value and vitality of the
American film and TV industries.' 35 In 1997, worldwide piracy
losses were estimated to be $2.2 billion, primarily related to pirated
material in VHS and VCD format. 36 Today, pirated materials are
found on optical discs, primarily in DVD and VCD format, and piracy
losses now hover around $3.5 billion. 3 7 The rate of DVD piracy has
38
shocked the movie industry.
The fate of the music industry makes optical disc piracy a real
threat to Hollywood. The music industry saw an explosion of burnt
blank recordable compact discs (CD-Rs), from 400 million in 1998 to
over one billion in 2003. 39 Similarly, "'[t]he marketplace is quickly

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; 2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 1.

30.
31.

ANTI-PIRACY, supra note 24.
2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 1.

32.
ANTI-PIRACY, supra note 24.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Press Release, MPAA, MPA Commends USTR "Special 301" Report:
Taiwan, Russia, and Poland on 'Priority Watch List," Thailand on 'Watch List" (May
1, 2003) (quoting Jack Valenti, MPA's Chairman and CEO), available at
http://www.ftac.net/6-MPAA-and_301.pdf [hereinafter 5/1/03 MPAA Press Release].
36.

2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 2.

37.
38.
39.

Id at 1.
Spark, supra note 7.
Fowler, supranote 8, at 45.
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transitioning to optical disc more quickly than anybody ever
anticipated.' 40 In 1998, the MPAA did not seize any "illegal DVDs
seven million
anywhere in the world. '41 In 2002, the MPAA seized
42
worldwide.
VCDs
million
twenty-six
and
DVDs
illegal
3. The Worldwide Reach of Optical Disc Piracy
Optical disc piracy does not just disrupt sales in the country in
which optical discs are produced. In the United States, illegal DVDs
from Taiwan costing one-fourth the price of other illegal DVDs have
flooded the New York market.4 3 In Asia, 90% "of the fake audio and
video products sold" in mainland China have been imported and most
"come from Hong Kong and Taiwan." 44
The allure of optical disc piracy can be attributed to high
profitability, low production overhead and low risk. 45 In the United
States, a CD-R can cost less than fifteen cents, 46 and a blank
47
recordable DVD (DVD-R) can cost less than twenty-five cents.
48
Pirated optical discs can sell for $10 or more.
Companies are not the only parties hurt by piracy. Consumers
can waste money in buying poor quality or non-functional optical
discs, which lack the quality guarantees associated with legitimate
Countries affected by piracy are also hurt by
optical discs. 49
"decreas[ed] tax revenues and deter[ed] investment."50 Not only do
pirates not pay any taxes or duties, they do not "comply with basic
of
and
safety
health
for
standards
manufacturing
'5 1
workers .... product quality, or performance.

40.
Worldwide
41.
42.
43.

Spark, supra note 7 (quoting Ken Jacobsen, the "MPAA's director for
Anti-Piracy Operations").
Id.
Id.
Dom Serafini, DVD Piracy in the U.S. Becomes an Industry, VIDEO AGE

INT'L, March/April 2003, at cover.

Irene Wang, Most Fake DVDs 'Imported Into Mainland;" 90 Percent of the
44.
Pirated Video Products Come from Overseas, Authorities Claim, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at 4.
45.
See WANG, supra note 12, at 150 (discussing overproduction and the
counterfeit optical disc enterprise).
80min/700mb,
Branded
CD-R
High
Speed
Shop4Tech,
52X
46.
http://www.shop4tech.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (selling 500 CD-Rs for $75.00).
47.
Shop4Tech, DVD Media, http://www.shop4tech.com/z/DVDMedia/l_88
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005) (selling 100 DVD-Rs for $22.00).
48.
CDRInfo.com, Showtime on Street for Pirated DVDs, July 8, 2002,
http://www.cdrinfo.com/Sections/News/Details.aspx?Newsld=6595.
49.
2005 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 21, at 3.
50.

Id.

51.

Id.
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B. Optical Disc Piracy in Taiwan
In 2004, motion picture piracy within Taiwan cost the motion
picture industry almost $40 million. 52 Taiwan's annual motion
picture piracy losses for 2005 are estimated at $67.8 million. 53 Much
of this can be attributed to optical disc piracy, which "makes up [a]
majority of pirated product being traded in Taiwan. ' 54 Taiwan's
technological, geographic, and commercial advantages-as opposed to
its market size-makes it a target for the reduction of optical disc
55
piracy.
Optical disc piracy affects all aspects of the motion picture
schedule in Taiwan. The legitimate film market is struggling as a
result of piracy, as seen in annual screen counts dropping an average
of 7% each year from 2000 to 2003.56
Consumer spending on
legitimate home entertainment products (VHS, VCD, and DVD) has
"suffered tremendously," averaging an annual consumer spending
reduction of 16% from 1996-2003. 57 Video rental has also seen a
58
continuous decline for the past two or three years.
1. Mass Producer and Trans-shipment Capital
Taiwan has been seen as "the traditional cent[er] of [worldwide]
DVD piracy. '59 Considered the "piracy export and transshipment
capital of the world," Taiwan's pirated product can be found all over
the world, harming transnational copyright industries far beyond the
'60
country's border, such as "South America, Europe and even Africa.
In 1999, Taiwan was the largest source of counterfeit CDs and DVDs

52.

IIPA,

USTR

2005

"SPECIAL

301"

RECOMMENDATIONS:

2003-2004

ESTIMATED TRADE LOSSES DUE TO COPYRIGHT PIRACY AND 2003--2004 ESTIMATED
LEVELS OF PIRAcY-ASIA PACIFIC (2005), http://iipa.com/pdf/2005_Febl0_ASIA_

PACIFICLOSSES.pdf

(last visited Feb. 12, 2006) [hereinafter IIPA 2003-2004

ESTIMATED TRADE LOSSES].
53.
2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 23.

54.
IIPA, IIPA 2005 SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN 455 (2005), http://www.iipa.com/
countryreports.html [hereinafter 2005 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN].
55.
WANG, supranote 12, at 148.
56.

2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 22.

57.
Id. at 23.
58.
Amber Chung, Piracy Driving Down Video Rentals, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb 14,
2004, at 11, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2004/02/
14/2003098740.
59.
Toughest Job in China?, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 7, 2004, at 14.
60.
WANG, supra note 12, at 147, 157-58, 160.
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found in the United States, 61 accounting for 43% of all pirated
62
products in the United States, up 490 % from the year before.
Taiwan is one of the top countries in Asia for total seizures of
pirated DVDs and DVD-Rs 63 and may be one of the world's three
largest sources of pirated optical discs. 64 Annual production of
pirated CDs and DVDs in Taiwan is estimated at more than $300
million. 65 In 2002, the number of seized pirated DVDs and seized
pirated VCDs increased 229% and 25%, respectively, from the year
66
before.
2. Night Markets
Night markets 6 7 in Taiwan have been a large source of pirated
optical disc commerce.
There are over 1000 night markets in
Taiwan,68 which likely sell thousands of infringed MPAA titles in
VCD and DVD format. 69 Pirates typically employ juveniles, who are
exempt from criminal responsibilities and serve to shield criminal
organizations. 70
In most cases, the juveniles are reprimanded
without criminal penalty. 71 In addition, pirates attempt to avoid
prosecution by employing a "conscience vending box," whereby
pirated disc purchasers place money in a box. 72 In the event of a
police raid, vendors could abandon both the box and goods without

61.
Id. at 158. The second top exporter was China accounting for 16% of the
pirated product in the United States. Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Winnie Chung, DVD Pirates Storm Through Asia, 380 HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, Aug. 19, 2003, at 118.
64.
See Flor Wang, Taiwan More Effective in Crackdown on Pirated Compact
Disks, CENT. NEWS AGENCY-TAIWAN, Oct. 7, 2003 (discussing a media report
supporting the assertion).
65.
EU Trade Envoy Says Piracy is Top Issue, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr.
17, 2003, at 2C.
66.
2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 22.
67.
Night markets are essentially flea markets that operate late in the evening.
They are the most visited place by tourists. See Sofia Wu, Night Markets Emerge as
Taiwan's Top Tourist Attraction, CENT. NEWS AGENCY ENG. NEWS, Aug. 4, 2004.
Vendors sell amongst other items food, souvenirs, gifts, casual clothing, toys, blue
movies, CDs, electronics, and traditional handicrafts. Mat Schaffer, In the Night
Kitchen; Taiwan's Street Markets Get Cooking After Dark, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 8,
2004, at 38. Shoppers can also "race turtles, buy goldfish and canaries, get a foot
massage or play pinball." Id. One night market is open every night, from early evening
until after midnight. See id. Night markets are particularly abundant in Taipei. See
id
68.
WANG, supra note 12, at 156.
69.
See Taiwan Offers Reward for Piracy Tip-offs, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Apr. 19, 2003.
70.
WANG, supra note 12, at 157.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
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penalty. 73 In 2002, 90% of night markets used this tactic. 74 Recent
amendments to Taiwan's copyright law have reduced pirated optical
75
disc sales at night markets.
3. Adaptation by Pirates
Increased copyright enforcement efforts have forced pirates to
evolve their tactics and explore new distribution avenues for pirated
optical discs. As law enforcement officials strengthen anti-piracy
efforts in certain areas, pirates move to less regulated areas of
distribution such as the internet and home delivery. 76 Pirates have
distributed pirated optical discs anonymously by advertising through
paper fliers. 77
"Pirate product catalogues are printed with
untraceable mobile phone numbers and spread around office
buildings. ' 78 Some pirates set up accounts at the post office and have
79
the post office collect the money and send the pirated merchandise.
Pirates also use courier services to deliver pirated products and
80
collect payment because there is a low risk of being caught.
Technological advances have made it more difficult to locate
8l
optical disc pirates. Pirates have switched from larger presser
8 2
operations to smaller, discreet, and more mobile burner
operations.8 3 About five years ago, optical disc piracy required
factory-produced disc-pressing equipment and large amounts of
capital.8 4 With old-style pressing, it took only one second to produce
86
an illegal disc.8 5 The discs, however, were large and easy to find.

73.
Id
74.
See IIPA, 2004 SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN 227 (2004), http://www.iipa.com/
countryreports.html (recommending that Taiwan be placed on the "Priority Watch" list
for 2004) [hereinafter 2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN].
75.
2005 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 54, at 456.
76.
Heaney, Seizures of Fake Discs Rise in Asia, supra note 18.
77.
Id.
78.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 227.
79.
Id.
80.

See id.

81.
Presser machines copy films onto optical discs very quickly, in about one
second. See Fowler, supra note 8, at 45 (comparing optical disc burners with presser
machines). However, the machines are large, expensive to purchase and "must be
registered and audited." Id. The DVDs and CDs presser machines create carry a
unique identification code. Id.
82.
Burner refers to very popular technology allowing movies and other media
to be copied onto DVD-Rs and CD-Rs. See id. (comparing optical disc burners with
presser machines). A copy is made by a laser, which marks light sensitive DVD-Rs and
CD-Rs. Compared to presser machines, burners are much slower; however they are
generally smaller and less regulated, and thus are harder to find. See id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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Further, presser machines in Taiwan must be registered and audited,
and the DVDs and CDs they produce carry a unique identification
code on their inner rings.8 7 These operations resulted in 87% of the
world's seized pirated DVDs, "including most of the videos sold on
street corners and alleys in America."88
Today, piracy operations are much smaller in size.8 9 Burners are
not regulated like presser machines. 90 Optical disc burners, which
make copies by marking light-sensitive discs with a laser, have made
operations cheaper, mobile, and easier to set up and hide. 91 Burners,
by contrast, are less efficient: the fastest drive takes ten minutes to
burn one disc and each disc needs to be labeled with a sticker, then
92
loaded and unloaded by hand.

III. THE MPAA:

STRENGTHENING COPYRIGHT LAW

& ENFORCEMENT

IN

TAIWAN
The MPAA's international anti-piracy program was established
in 1976. 93 The program's goals are to
implement and strengthen existing copyright legislation, assist local
governments and law enforcement authorities in the investigation and
prosecution of piracy cases, initiate civil litigation on behalf of its
Member Companies against copyright infringers, and conduct
education outreach programs regarding the harmful effects of piracy
and works to strengthen the copyright law of other nations and suggest
appropriate penalties.

94

The association supports immediate action to address Taiwan's
"egregious piracy situation."95
A. The MPAA's Copyright Law Enforcement Efforts in Taiwan
The MPAA's Taiwan branch has a staff of eleven. 97 MPAA
experts, in partnership with worldwide justice officials, lead

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.
ANTI-PIRACY, supra note 24.
94.
Id.
95.
MPA Lauds Congress Washington Urges Taiwan to Crack Down on Piracy,
IN FOCUS, Jan. 2003, http://www.infocusmag.com/.\03January\international.htm.
97.
WANG, supra note 12, at 156.
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investigations, raids and seizures. 98 On May 25, 2004, the MPAA
conducted the largest raid ever in Taiwan on an illegal optical disc
burning lab. 99 The joint operation, involving the Ministry of Justice
Investigation Bureau, seized 40 DVD-R burners, 476 CD-R burners,

and 250,300 burned CD-Rs. 10 0 In one year's time, the lab could have
generated NT$645 million (US$19.56 million). 10 ' The MPAA believes
the raid underscores the continuing problem of piracy in Taiwan. 102
The MPAA conducted thirteen factory raids in 2003, which led to the4
10
closing of four unlicensed plants.1 0 3 In addition 1,719 masters,
300,849 pirate discs, 8 VCD production
lines, and 11 printing and
10 5
packaging machines were seized.
The MPAA has also organized anti-piracy demonstrations. On
April 5, 2002, the MPAA and other entities representing copyright
owners organized an anti-piracy protest in Taipei. 0 6 Participants
included major exhibitors, distributors, retailers, and artists. The
goal was to influence the government to make piracy a public crime
and set up a police task force.' 0 7 Recently, to further promote public
awareness, the MPAA has included anti-piracy trailers in its
08

theatrical distributions.1

The MPAA's Taiwan branch has also made available US$150,000
in rewards for successful raids, allowed for confidential emails, and
opened a national hotline to report factories burning fake DVDs.i 0 9

98.
See 2003 FULL TEN COUNTRY PIRACY FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 1.
99.
Press Release, MPAA, Raid Uncovers Largest Optical Disc Source Lab Ever
Found in Taiwan-Thousands of PiratedMovies (May 27, 2004) (on file with VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L.).

100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supranote 74, at 230.
104.
A "master" is an original copy from which copies of motion pictures can be
made. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.m-w.com (last visited Feb.
12, 2006).
105.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supranote 74, at 230.
106.
WANG, supra note 12, at 140.
107.

Id. at 140, 148.

108.
Anti-Piracy Move to Target Video Shops, CHINA POST, Feb. 2, 2005,
availableat 2005 WLNR 1591468.
109.
Bill Heaney, Lu wants Taiwan off US' 301 list, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003,
available at http://www.taipetimes.com/news/biz/archives/2003/02/22/195525 [hereinafter
Heaney, Lu wants Taiwan off US' 301 list]; Fowler, supra note 8, at 45; MPA Launches
Anti-Piracy Rewards Programme, SCREEN DIG., Mar.,
2003, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-go2637/is_200303/ain7470111; Rina Chandran,
Motion Picture Body Cracks Down on DVD Piracy, HINDU BUS. LINE, Mar. 20, 2004,
availableat http'//www.blonnet.com/2003/0320/stories/2003032000950600.htm.
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MPA/IIPA Motion Picture Copyri ht Enforcement Statistics For Taiwan
Actions

1 10

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

283

1,118

698

655

608

Number of VCDs seized

3421

110,000

Number of DVDs

766

115,551

232,617

1,078,474

1,222

1116

13

34

607

425

Number of raids

conducted

seized

Number of CDs and
CD-Rs seized

Number of
investigations

Number of VCD/CD lab
factory raids
Number of cases

150

1,060

commenced

671
(367/304)

(adults/juveniles)
Number of indictments
Number of defendants

469

256

69

488

876

435

269

4

10

9

3

0

77

562

574

253

209

convicted (including
guilty pleas)
Acquittals and
dismissals
Numbers of cases
pending

Number of factory (and

11

CD-R lab) cases
pending
Total number of cases

57

96

332

132

18

49

128

69

Maximum 6 months

3

25

45

0

Over 6 months

4

6

17

0

0

Overl year

11

18

66

69

15

Total suspended
prison terms

226mths

506mths

1,443mths

2424mths

936mths

47

204

201

63

resulting in jail time
Suspended prison
terms

Prison terms served
(not suspended)

39
I

0

III

110.
2005 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 54, at 464; 2004 IIPA SPECIAL
301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 234; IIPA, 2003 SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN 312-14 (2003),
http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html [hereinafter 2003 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN]
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Maximum 6 months

7

33

132

108

38

Over 6 months

3

3

16

18

2

29

11

56

75

8

291mths

386mths

1,800mths

455mnths

345mths

6

1

10

10

0

Over 1 year
Total suspended prison
terms (not suspended)
Number of cases
resulting in criminal
fines
Up to $1,000

1

Between $1,000 and

4

1

0

0

1

5

8

0

4

2

0

$1,515

$63,314

$37,056

0

$5,000
Over $5,000
Total amount of fines
levied (in US$)

1
I

B. The MPAA's Legislative Reform Efforts in Taiwan
The MPAA and its affiliated organizations are a powerful
lobbying group in Taiwan"' and have encouraged Taiwan to amend
its copyright law. 112 Through its membership in the TIPA, the MPAA
has influenced the USTR to pressure Taiwan to improve its copyright
law and enforcement under "Special 301. 'u 1
1. USTR: "Special 301"
Formed in 1962 as the Special Trade Representative for Trade
Negotiations, the USTR makes and administers U.S. trade policy,
leads all trade negotiations and represents the U.S. government
before international trade organizations. 114 The USTR also acts as
an international trade agent for U.S. business under "Special 301" of
the 1988 Trade Act. 115
"Special 301" is an effective tool in "dealing with nations that
impose barriers against U.S. film, TV programs and home video

111.
See Heaney, Software Industry Walks Copyright Tightrope, supra note 14.
112.
See 2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 223 (requesting
Taiwan to amend its copyright law).
113.
See Description of the IIPA, supra note 15 (discussing the role of the IIPA
in USTR actions). Every year, the IIPA submits to the USTR a list of suggested
countries with IPR problems and detailed explanations. Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's
Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L. J. 87, 102 (1994).
114.
MICHAEL P. RYAN, PLAYING BY THE RULES: AMERICAN TRADE POWER AND
DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC 31 (1995).
115.
Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2005).
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material, or permit these exports to be pirated." 116 It is designed to
enhance the United States' ability to negotiate IPR improvement with
1 17
foreign countries.
By April 30 of each year, the USTR must identify foreign
countries that deny "adequate and effective" protection of intellectual
property rights or "fair and equitable market access" to U.S. persons
relying upon IPR protection. 118 A country can be found to deny
adequate and equitable intellectual property protection even if it is in
compliance with its obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. 119
The USTR conducts preliminary investigations to determine
whether countries have IPR problems, 120 which may be self-initiated
by the USTR or through petition by "interested persons,"'12 1 such as
the IIPA. A petition by an "interested person" allows U.S. industries
to directly communicate with the USTR. 122 Petitions describe how
domestic industries are economically affected by foreign piracy, the
volume of trade affected, the manner in which the practice is
unreasonable, and the specific intellectual property right being
violated. 123 Further, it allows the USTR to present specific demands
12 4
in its negotiations with other countries.
Countries identified by the USTR may be placed into a hierarchy
of categories. 125
The Priority Foreign Country designation is
reserved for countries "that have the most onerous or egregious acts,
policies, or practices that have the greatest adverse impact" on
intellectual property rights. 126 A Priority Foreign Country may be
12 7
subject to further investigation and trade sanctions.

116.
117.

5/1/03 MPAA Press Release, supra note 35; See 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
GRIER, supra note 17.

118.
Id.
119.
See id. The TRIPS agreement established minimum levels of protection
that each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members.
See WTO, Intellectual Property (TRIPS), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/
trips-e.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) [hereinafter TRIPS].
120.
Preeti Sinha, Special 301: An Effective Tool Against Thailand's Intellectual
Property Violations, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 281, 287 (1993).

121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.

124.

Id.

125.
Press Release, Office of the USTR, U.S. Announces Results of IPR Out-ofCycle Reviews for Poland and Taiwan (January 18, 2005) available at
http://www.ustr.gov (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink) [hereinafter 1/18/05 USTR
Press Release].
126.
Allison Cychosz, The Effectiveness of International Enforcement of
Intellectual PropertyRights, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 985, 1001 (2004).
127.
InternationalDevelopment-USTR "Special 301" Report Released, 16(8) J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 19, 19 (2004).
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A Priority Watch designation is the second most severe
designation 128 and signifies that the country's acts, intellectual
property laws, or enforcement practices are of major concern to the
United States, but are not quite to the level of a Priority Foreign
Country. 129 Countries on the Priority Watch list are subject to
increased bilateral attention. 130 The Watch List is the least severe
designation and indicates that the country "warrant[s] special
practices or
attention because they maintain intellectual property
13 1
barriers to market access that is of particular concern."
If the country identified under "Special 301" does not negotiate
with the federal government within six months or if such negotiations
132
In the
are ineffective, unilateral trade sanctions may be imposed.
past, U.S. retaliatory acts have included tariffs, mirror legislation,
and import quotas. 133 The effect of "Special 301" is dependent on the
country's political economy. 134 Retaliatory acts are most effective
135
when a country relies heavily on exports to the United States,
which is the case for Taiwan.
Moreover, being on any one the USTR's "Special 301" lists hurts
a country's international image. Designation on any list "serves both
to warn foreign countries of the USTR's concerns and impending
consultations and to warn U.S. investors that their intellectual
property rights may not be adequately protected."'1 36 A country can
be added or removed from the Priority Foreign Country, Priority
Watch or Watch Lists during the annual review or out-of-cycle
37
reviews.'

Tim Culpan, Copycat Crime, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 8, 2003, at 11.
128.
See Cychosz, supra note 125, at 1001-02; see GRIER, supranote 17.
129.
Facts and Figures, supra note 19. The bilateral trade-based approach
130.
involves direct trade negotiations between the United States and the foreign country.
See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual PropertyAbroad: Toward
a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 295 (1991). If intellectual property
protection is adequate in the foreign country, U.S. direct investment will occur and
export to the United States will be facilitated. Id. If not, economic sanctions are
imposed on the foreign country until there is an agreement over intellectual property
matters. Id.
Cychosz, supra note 125, at 1002.
131.
See Leaffer, supra note 129, at 295-96 (citing the Omnibus trade and
132.
Competitiveness Act of 1988 amending the 1974 Trade Act.); Taiwan Offers Reward for
Piracy Tip-offs, supra note 69.
Fusae Nara, A Shift Toward Protectionism Under S 301 of the 1974 Trade
133.
Act: Problems of UnilateralTrade Retaliation Under InternationalLaw, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 229, 236-40 (1990).
ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
134.
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 38 (2005).

135.
136.

Nara, supranote 132, at 240.
Ronald J. T. Corbett, Protectingand Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights

in Developing Countries,35 INT'L L. 1083, 1088 (2001).

137.

Facts and Figures, supra note 19.
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2. Influencing the USTR
There is a strong correlation between IIPA recommendations and
the USTR's annual list of countries with IPR problems. 138 With the
core copyright industry, 139 which has played a dominant role in the
creation of "Special 301," accounting for an estimated 6% of the U.S.
gross domestic product ($626.6 billion), 140 and the IIPA's provision of
credible data and recommendations to the USTR, which are
comparatively better prepared and more influential than the reports
of other intellectual property associations, 141 this correlation may be
of little surprise. Since 1996, the USTR has agreed with the IIPA's
14 2
recommendations for Taiwan eight times, or 73% of the time.
There has also been a strong resemblance in allegations against and
requests for improvement in Taiwan in the IIPA's recommendations
and the USTR's explanations for a country's "Special 301" placement.

138.
Liu, supra note 112, at 102.
139.
Core copyright industries are those industries whose primary purpose is to
produce or distribute copyright materials. Press Release, IIPA, IIPA's New Economic
Study Reveals the Copyright Industries Continues to be a Driving Force in the U.S.
Economy (Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.iipa.com/pressrel.html. These industries include
newspapers, book publishing, recording, music, and periodicals, motion pictures, radio
and television broadcasting, and computer software (including business application
and entertainment software). Id.
140.

STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE

2004 REPORT i (2004), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2004-SIWEKFULL.pdf
141.
See MERTHA, supra note 133, at 60-61 (suggesting that the data and
conclusions submitted by the IIPA to the USTR are quite influential on the USTR).
142.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, app. d at 3; 2004 IIPA
SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 223; Letter from Eric H. Smith, President,
IIPA, to Sybia Harrison, Special Assistant to the Section 301 Committee, Office of the
USTR (Nov. 4, 2004), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Nov4_IIPA301_OCR_
RecommendationTaiwan.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Eric H. Smith]; 2005 IIPA
SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 54, at 453; 2004 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra
note 20, at 20; 1/18/05 USTR Press Release, supra note 124; 2005 USTR SPECIAL 301
REPORT, supra note 21, at 47.
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1989

Priority Watch List

1990

Watch List

1991

Watch List

1992

Priority Foreign Country

1993

Priority Watch List

1994

Watch List
Watch List

1995
1996

Watch List

1997

Watch List

1998

Watch List

1999

Watch List

Watch List

2000

Priority Watch List

Watch List (with an out-of-cycle
review)

2001

Priority Watch List

Priority Watch List

2002

Priority Watch List

Priority Watch List

2003

Priority Watch List

Priority Watch List

2004

Priority Watch List (with an out-of-

Priority Watch List (with an out-

Watch List

cycle review)

of-cycle review)

(out of
cycle
review)

Watch List

Watch List

2005

Watch List

Watch List

IV. TAIWAN: A LONG

HISTORY OF BEING ON THE
LISTS

USTR's "SPECIAL 301"

A. IPR Problemsfrom the Very Beginning: Taiwan's Stall Tactics
Historically, Taiwan has followed a policy of making concessions
to the United States only after being placed on one of the USTR's

143.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, app. d at 3; 2004 IIPA
SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 223; Letter from Eric H. Smith, supra note 141;
2005 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 54, at 453.
144.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, app. d at 3; 2004 USTR
SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, at 20; 1/18/05 USTR Press Release, supra note
124.
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"Special 301" lists-the more severe the designation, the greater the
concession. In 1989, the first year "Special 301" was enacted, Taiwan
was placed on the Priority Watch List. 145 Less than one month later,
Taiwan promised to pass intellectual property legislation and comply
with the 1989 U.S.-Taiwan Bilateral Copyright Agreement, which
provides greater protection to U.S. copyright holders. 146 Taiwan also
made unprecedented concessions related to counterfeiting, becoming
1 47
the only country at that time to have such stringent requirements.
For the next two years, Taiwan was designated a Watch List
8
country.14
In 1992, Taiwan had failed to fully abide by the 1989 Agreement
and was named a Priority Foreign Country. 149 In May 1992, Taiwan
amended its copyright law. 150 Just seven days after the USTR began
its investigation following the designation, 151 Taiwan promulgated
the "Protecting the Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan" and
negotiated with the USTR for resolution. 152 An agreement was
reached in June 1992 that involved the drafting, amending, and
enforcement of IP laws. 1 53 Before the USTR review in April 1993,
the Taiwan legislature held a last minute session to implement
commitments made pursuant to the 1992 agreement 154 and the 1989
Bilateral Agreement, and passed the Agreement for the Protection of
for North American
Copyright between the Coordination Council
155
Taiwan.
in
Institute
American
the
and
Affairs
In 1993, the USTR took Taiwan off the Priority Foreign Country
list, but still placed Taiwan on the Priority Watch List because it felt
that the legislation was "watered down" and did not fully incorporate
the 1989 agreement. 156 Despite resentment towards the United
States for this designation, 15 7 Taiwan proposed "Guidelines on the
Full Administration of Intellectual Property Protection" and began
negotiations with the USTR. 15s Two months later, a memorandum of
understanding for the protection of intellectual property rights was

Liu, supra note 112, at 113.
145.
Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 In Creating Long Term
146.
Copyright Protection For U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM.
29, 39 (1995).
147.
Id.
Liu, supra note 112, at 113.
148.
149.
Newby, supra note 145, at 39-40.
WANG, supra note 12, at 180.
150.
Id.
151.
152.
Liu, supra note 112, at 113.
Id.
153.
154.
Id.
Newby, supra note 145, at 40.
155.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
Liu, supra note 112, at 113.
158.
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signed in Washington D.C., 159 with the guidelines being implemented
in July 1993.160 From 1994-1999, Taiwan found itself on and off the
16 1
"Special 301" Watch List.
B. The Return of the Priority Watch List (2000-2004)
In 2000 and 2001, Taiwan was again placed on the Priority
Watch List. 162 Taiwan's return to the Priority Watch List has been
attributed to "optical media production operations get[ting]
163
completely out of control."'
1.

2002: The Action Year of the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights

Continued placement on the Priority Watch List led Taiwan to
1 64
implement the "2002 Action Year for IPR Protection campaign.'
The goals of this campaign were heightened education programs,
adequate and effective legislation, and substantial enforcement
actions. 16 5 This was followed by a three-year Comprehensive IPR
Protection Action Plan, designed to continue and build upon this
166
campaign.
As part of Taiwan's heightened education programs, schools at
all levels were required to introduce concepts of IPR protection into
their curriculum. 167 Teachers and students were reminded to watch
for unauthorized use of copyrighted materials. 168
Policies and
penalties related to IPR protection were also presented on school

159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
See WANG, supra note 12, at 152 (describing 301 decisions in Taiwan from
1989-2001); 2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
162.
See WANG, supra note 12, at 152 (describing 301 decisions in Taiwan from
1989-2001); 2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.

163.
Taiwan Should Stay on the U.S. IPR List: Expert, CHINA POST, Feb. 7,
2004, availableat 2004 WL 64367964.
164.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, TAIWAN'S
COMMITMENT TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: JANUARY-AUGUST 2003
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON TAIWAN's INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION

(discussing the Action Year of the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), available
at http:lwww.gio.gov.twltaiwan-websitel5-gpflprlipr.htm [hereinafter JANUARYAUGUST 2003 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT].
165.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, TAIWAN'S
COMMITMENT TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS PROTECTION IN TAIWAN, Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/
taiwan-website/5-gp/Ipr/ipr.htm
PROTECTION IN TAIWAN].

166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.

[hereinafter

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS
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campuses, which were subjected to regular and random inspections to
169
determine the progress of IPR protection.
The government also made available "public and campus
seminars, two-dimensional and television advertisements and public
displays, large outdoor promotions and concerts, and a series of
television and radio shows.' 170
Taiwanese industries and the
Ministry of Economic Affairs held public destructions of pirated
optical discs, often in locations where optical disc piracy has been the
most prevalent. 171 During a three-day demonstration, approximately
200,000 pirated optical discs were destroyed. 172 Taiwan has promised
173
the deployment of additional policies and programs.
2. Prosecuting Optical Disc Pirates Becomes Easier
Taiwan's return to the Priority Watch List led to the amendment
of Taiwan's copyright law to further target CD, DVD, software, and
other digital media piracy. 174
The amendments also made
prosecuting pirates easier. 175 For example, the manufacture and sale
of pirated optical discs for profit became a "public crime," which
allowed
law enforcement
officials
to prosecute copyright
infringements even in the absence of a filed complaint. 176 Other
177
infringements remain complaint-based.
The amendments also increased penalties for copyright
178
infringement. Prison sentences were increased to seven years.
The maximum criminal fine was increased to NT$8 million
(US$230,000), 179 up from NT$450,000 in 2002. 180 Further, if the
infringing party's profits exceeded the maximum fine, the fine could
be increased beyond NT$8 million.' 8 ' In civil actions, the statutory

169.

Id.

170.
Id.
171.
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 2002
PERFORMANCE REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TAIWAN 18 (2003).
172.
Id.
173.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION IN TAIWAN, supra note 164.

174.

International Development-Taiwan Amends Copyright Law, supra note

18, at 22-23.
175.
Software Piracy in Taiwan Decreased by 10%, Nearing Global Average,

TAIWAN IPR NEWS, Jun. 16, 2003 (on file with VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.)
176. International Development-Taiwan Amends Copyright Law, supra note
18, at 23; Software Piracy in Taiwan Decreased by 10%, Nearing Global Average, supra
note 174.
177.
Software Piracy in Taiwan Decreased by 10%, Nearing Global Average,
supra note 174.

178.
18, at 23.
179.
180.
181.

International Development-Taiwan Amends Copyright Law, supra note
Id.
See Taiwan Offers Reward for Piracy Tip-offs, supra note 69.
JANUARY-AUGUST 2003 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 163.
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compensation increased to NT$5 million (US$143,000), 18 2 up from
NT$1 million in 2002.183 The 2003 amendments also eliminated a
184
minimum six month jail term.
3. Failure to Adopt the Executive Yuan's 2003 Amendments
The 2004 IIPA recommendation to the USTR praised Taiwan's
improvement in combating optical disc piracy:
Taiwan has ... done a much better job of inspecting suspected plants,
closing down lines and reducing overall factory production of pirate
product which now must be sustained. The enforcement authorities
have also undertaken numerous ex officio, raids now permitted under
the new copyright amendments, against wholesalers, retailers and
185
night markets, making a significant dent in piracy in this sector.

However, the IIPA noted that "[diespite enforcement improvements,
Taiwan's market continues to be plagued by optical media piracy of
all kinds, including growing CD-R and DVD-R 'burning' in operations
run by organized criminal syndicates, by wholesale and retail piracy,
and by increasing Internet piracy. '18 6 The motion picture industry
recommended that Taiwan's copyright law be further amended and
that enforcement be strengthened. 1 87 Much of the IIPA and USTR's
discontent stems from the Legislative Yuan's' 8 8 failure to adopt the
Executive Yuan's 8 9 2003 Amendments to the copyright law, which
represented the recommendations of the IIPA membership and the
The USTR's "Special 301" report, placing
U.S. government. 190
Taiwan on the Priority Watch, incorporates most of IIPA's
aforementioned points and endorses the IIPA's recommendation that
Taiwan be subject to an out-of-cycle review later in the year to
determine whether any progress had been made in IPR protection. 191
Although not mentioned in the USTR's "Special 301" Report, the
2004 IIPA report recommended a number of immediate actions from

Id.
182.
183.
Id.
Id.
184.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 225.
185.
186.
Id.
Id. at 223.
187.
188.
The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ in Taiwan, and the
laws enacted by the Legislative Yuan are applicable throughout Taiwan. HANBAO MA,
TRADE AND INVESTMENT INTAIWAN 7 (Herbert H.P. Ma & In-Jaw Lai eds., 2d ed. 1997).
The Executive Yuan is the highest IPR policy-making body. WANG, supra
189.
note 12, at 155. It is also one of five government departments having administrative
power. MA, supranote 187, at 5. The other four departments are the Legislative Yuan,
Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Id.
190.
2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 74, at 234-35.
Compare id. at 223, with 2004 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, at
191.
20-21.
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Taiwan relating to optical disc piracy.
The IIPA desired the
immediate adoption of the amendments approved by the Executive
Yuan as soon as possible after March 2004.192 Amongst other
demands, the IIPA sought clarification on whether customs officials
have ex officio authority to seize goods.' 93 The IIPA also sought the
reinstatement of minimum penalties for violations and mandatory
194
jail time for violations of the copyright law.
In addition, the IIPA sought to amend the Optical Media
Management Law (OMML), which regulates the plants engaged in
the production of optical discs by requiring producers to have permits,
place codes on discs, and produce reports.' 9 5 The IIPA sought
increased penalties and overall deterrence by expanding the OMML's
coverage to deal with the "massive commercial production of CD-Rs,
and by ensuring that deterrent penalties, including immediate license
96
withdrawal, [were] imposed.'
C. Continued Improvement Leads to a Downgrade to the Watch List
(Late 2004-Present)
In November 2004, the IIPA recommended that Taiwan be
downgraded to the USTR's Watch List. Even though Taiwan did not
amend the OMML as the IIPA had requested, it made significant
improvements in amending the copyright law and increasing
enforcement of the OMML. 197 The Legislative Yuan did not fully
adopt the Executive Yuan's amendments to the copyright law, but it
"substantially followed" the Executive Yuan's recommendations. 198
The Legislative Yuan also did not reinstate minimum penalties and
jail time for certain offenses. 199 Nevertheless, the IIPA was satisfied
with the current amendments to the copyright law but was fearful
20 0
that more deterring penalties may be necessary.
On January 18, 2005, the USTR agreed with the IIPA and
downgraded Taiwan to the Watch List due to the progress it had
''20 1
achieved in "strengthening enforcement and copyright protection.
In spring of 2005, the USTR again agreed with the IIPA's
recommendation to keep Taiwan on the Watch List. 20 2 However, the

192.
193.
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195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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2004 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supranote 74, at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 224.
Letter from Eric H. Smith, supra note 141, at 2.
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Id. at 2-3.
1/18/05 USTR Press Release, supra note 124.
2005 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 21, at 47-48.
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USTR's report failed to adopt the IIPA's recommendations as to
optical disc piracy, which included the targeting of burner and blank
disc operations, the reinstatement of minimum penalties for certain
copyright violations and amendment of the OMML. 203 In fact, the
USTR's near silence and continued failure to adopt the IIPA's
recommendation concerning optical disc piracy suggests that the
USTR may be generally satisfied with Taiwan's improvement as it
pertains to optical disc piracy. The 2005 USTR "Special 301" Report
notes:
During the past year, Taiwan's IPR task force increased inspections of
optical media factories and retail distribution centers, and the number
of raids and inspections conducted by the National Police also increased
sharply. The U.S. copyright industry reports that Taiwan's increased
enforcement efforts resulted in a significant drop in estimated trade
losses from a high of $847.9 million in 2002 to $315.5 million in
2004.204

For the time being, it appears the USTR's efforts have shifted to
Internet piracy of copyrighted works, corporate end-user business
20 5
software piracy, and the illegal copying of textbooks.

V. ANALYSIS
The fate of the optical disc piracy in Taiwan is unclear. In the
big picture, optical disc piracy is one of many U.S. interests in
Taiwan. Fortunately for the MPAA, "Special 301" provides a means
by which the motion picture industry can influence IPR change in
foreign nations. In fact, the United States is the most influential
player in shaping IP policy in Taiwan.2 0 6 However, although the
copyright industry as represented by the IIPA generates significant
revenue in the United States and has significant influence on the
USTR, motion picture companies wishing to address optical piracy
will still have to compete with other intellectual property interests,
such as patent and trademark. Further, the MPAA must also
compete with other copyright interests.
The IIPA represents the interests of six copyright trade
associations in addition to the MPAA. These other trade associations
include the American Association of Publishers, the Business
Software Alliance, the Entertainment Software Association, the
Independent Film & Television Alliance, National Music Publishers'

203.
204.
205.
206.

See id.; 2005 IIPA SPECIAL 301: TAIWAN, supra note 54, at 453, 456, 467-69.
2005 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supranote 21, at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
WANG, supra note 12, at 148.
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Association, and the Recording Industry Association of America. 20 7
Given the potential barrage of requests and demands from many
intellectual property interests, Taiwan and the USTR can only
realistically address so many at once. Optical disc piracy may
potentially become low priority.
Nevertheless, both the IIPA and USTR have made specific
requests related to the minimizing of optical disc piracy in Taiwan.
There are many reasons to believe Taiwan will concede to the optical
disc demands of the United States Yet, there are many reasons why
Taiwan may not fully concede. Some of the more salient reasons will
be discussed in the following paragraphs.
A. Why Taiwan May Concede
1. Internal Pressure: Rise of Domestic Intellectual Property
As a developing industrialized nation with much economic
power, local development may provide an internal push to increase
IPR protection. For example, Taiwan has exhibited great strength in
the high-technology area. 20 8
Taiwan's information technology,
semiconductors, and electronic components account for 35-40% of its
20 9
total exports.
Naturally, these local industries will seek IPR protection. Their
combined power will create a domestic push for increased protection
and enforcement. Although Taiwan's high-technology advancements
generally concern patent rights, a push for increased patent
protection may have copyright implications or spark a broad push for
increased IPR protection.
Also, "Taiwan's own copyright owners have become greater in
number and more vocal," and will likely advocate the strengthening
of copyright law and enforcement. 210 There is a significant domestic
industry in software development. 2 11
For example, developers
licensed by Microsoft have created Chinese versions of Microsoft
software. 212 Such developers will want their works protected. In
fact, local Taiwanese companies such as Kenex, Acer, and Ta-t'ung
have lobbied the Legislative Yuan to amend the copyright law. 213

207.
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208.
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Given that copyright industries seek a similar goal, individual action
pushing for increased fines or prison time for copyright violations will
likely effect optical disc pirates.
At the very least, Taiwan's
development may inspire confidence in competing fairly in the global
market.
Moreover, the traditional justification for piracy may no longer
apply to Taiwan. Historically, Taiwan justified lenient intellectual
property laws because it allowed the country to develop. It adhered
to the notion that lesser developed countries often lack the resources
to create their own intellectual property.
Copying intellectual
property would give Taiwan the time, tools, and edge to compete
industrially with other nations. Both private and public resources
would be required to independently research and develop similar
intellectual property or to license products or replicate methods
already developed. 2 14 Copyright enforcement would protect foreign
interests at the expense of their own producers.
Taiwan's traditional justifications, however, have little
application in the case of motion picture theft. The development of a
nation is not necessarily tied to the efficiencies and cost savings
involved in allowing motion pictures to be counterfeited onto optical
discs.
As opposed to technology that is integral to economic
development and advancement and has practical applications, motion
pictures fall within the realm of entertainment. Although society as a
whole greatly benefits from the promotion of the arts in the form of a
motion picture, it is not vital to Taiwan's economic development.
2. External Pressure: Trade Leverage by the United States
Despite being a newly industrialized country with a historically
uncertain political status, Taiwan is "a major global economic
player. ' 215 Taiwan's economic power ranks approximately fifteenth
in the world.2 16 In the second half of 2003, the nation recovered from
a recession that began that year as a byproduct of the Iraqi war and
the SARS epidemic. 217 Demand for Taiwan's exports and foreign
investment produced GNP growth of 3.2% in 2003, one of the highest
rates in the region.21 8 It was estimated that "strong foreign demand

214.
See Sinha, supra note 119, at 282-83 (discussing justifications for lenient
intellectual property laws in developing countries).
215.
Sun, supra note 207, at 71.
216.
Id.
217.

USTR, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN

TRADE

BARRIERS 450 (attributing Taiwan's economic status to exports and foreign
investment), available at http://www.ustr.gov (follow "Document Library" hyperlink;
then follow "Reports/Publications" hyperlink). [hereinafter 2004 NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS].
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should continue to drive growth for Taiwan's export-oriented economy
in 2004, and GNP should reach 4.5 to 5 percent.219
Overall, Taiwan is the ninth-largest trading partner of the
United States 220 and second-largest to Japan in Asia. 22 1 The USTR's
2005 National Trade Estimate notes:
The U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan was $12.9 billion in 2004, a decrease
of $1.3 billion from $14.2 billion in 2003. U.S. goods exports in 2004
were $21.7 billion, up 24.6 percent from the previous year.
Corresponding U.S. imports from Taiwan were $34.6 billion, up 9.6
percent. 222

In 2004, Taiwan's trade surplus was $6.14 billion-the lowest since
1999.223
Exports grew 20.7% and imports 31.9%.224
Taiwan's
economic power is impressive, especially in light of its population of
approximately twenty-one million located within 14,000 mostly
225
mountainous square miles.
Taiwan's economy, however, is dependent on exports and foreign
investment from the United States 226 Much of Taiwan's trade
surplus is the result of trading with the United States 227 U.S. foreign
direct investment stock in Taiwan in 2004 was $11 billion, up from
$10.2 billion in 2002.228
In addition, many countries rely on the USTR's "Special 301"
report to address IPR concerns in their country and in making IPR
demands on Taiwan. A negative report from the USTR may mean
that other countries may encourage similar policies toward Taiwan.
To upset the United States may be the equivalent of upsetting the
rest of the world. Further, placement on the USTR's "Special 301"
229
lists tarnishes Taiwan's international reputation.
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Moreover, although rare, 23 0 trade sanctions are a realistic threat.
The United States has imposed $75 million in trade sanctions on
imports from the Ukraine because of "repeated failure" to "enact and
enforce adequate optical disc media licensing legislation. '23 1 In the
past, Taiwan has demonstrated a similar reluctance to amend
copyright legislation. The United States has also threatened trade
sanctions on China because of piracy. 23 2 Historically, Taiwan has
been on the same "Special 301" lists as China including being
designated a Priority Foreign Country in 1992.233
Given these
similarities, Taiwan could also be a recipient of trade sanctions.
Regardless of the argument concerning the overall effectiveness of
trade sanctions,23 4 they stand to directly harm Taiwan's economy.
It would be in Taiwan's economic interest to eliminate optical
disc piracy. Pirated products constitute a very small portion of
Taiwan's overall exports. 235 In addition, optical disc piracy has been
associated with organized crime. Any revenues generated from these
illegal sales likely will not be distributed to the public or legitimate
industries, but rather, may concentrate with illegitimate sources and
fund other illegal activities.
3. Past Practice
Taiwan's history suggests that it fears the ramifications of
"Special 301" identification and that Taiwan will likely concede to
future demands by the United States Generally, every time it has
been placed on a "Special 301" list, Taiwan has made concessions to
the United States in hopes of being removed from the list or being
upgraded the following year.
Taiwan is incentivized to make
concessions when it is given a more severe designation. These
concessions have taken the form of promises to increase copyright
legislation and enforcement.
Taiwan, however, also deliberately
delays the implementation of these promises as long as possible. This
has been termed the "clever concession" strategy. 236 This suggests
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Matthew Pietsch, International Copyright Infringement and the Internet:
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China for software, music and video tape piracy).
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234.
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MERTHA, supra note 133, at 6.
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that only when Taiwan feels sufficiently threatened will it
implement, ever so sparingly, past promises.
For example, after being placed on the Priority Watch list in
1989, Taiwan entered into negotiations with the U.S just one month
later. One result of the negotiations was the 1989 U.S.-Taiwan
Bilateral Agreement. By 1992, Taiwan had failed to implement the
agreement and the USTR identified Taiwan as a Priority Foreign
Country. At that point Taiwan made further concessions, but only
some aspects of the 1989 agreement were passed by the legislature in
1993. Partial passage of the agreement, however, was sufficient to
23 7
earn Taiwan a downgrade to the Priority Watch list.
Another example involves amendments approved by the
Executive Yuan in 2003. The MPAA believed these amendments,
which adopted most of the recommendations of the motion picture
industry and the U.S. government, would be passed by the
legislature. 23 8 Instead, 2003 led to the adoption of a different set of
copyright law amendments. 23 9 As a result, Taiwan remained on the
Priority Watch list in 2004. Three months later, Taiwan amended its
copyright law to adopt many of the amendments approved by the
Executive Yuan, and since then the USTR has recently downgraded
240
Taiwan to the Watch list.
B. Why Taiwan May Not Concede
1. Cultural hurdles
Although Taiwan's copyright law may at one time provide the
framework in which optical disc piracy could be eliminated,
Taiwanese culture will be an impediment to perfect enforcement. The
Chinese view society from a community perspective, where each
241
person has an obligation to everyone else in the community.
Within the community are distinctions between superior members of
society, and the inferior owners who owe a duty of loyalty and
support. 242 When a community member informs law enforcement
officials about instances of optical disc piracy by those within the
community, it may be seen as an act of disloyalty, not only to the
party, but to the rest of the community at large. This would be
particularly disruptive if the pirate was someone of superior status.
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Also, many Taiwanese, including law enforcement officials,
believe that "copyright infringement is a minor moral offense, if it is
even an offense at all. '243 The foundation for this belief can be
attributed to mainland Chinese culture and traditional Chinese
concepts of intellectual property, which include encouragement by the
society's intellectual elite to copy each other's work and the Confucian
244
derogation of most creative works.
Further, Taiwan is very sensitive to foreign pressure. Taiwan's
distrust and resentment of foreign pressure stem from actions of
European countries and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries and also from diplomatic and political oppression. 245 The
"Anti-Anti-Piracy Alliance," formed by students across numerous
college campuses, has opposed increased IP protection and has
accused "the government of collaborating with foreign powers in
oppressing its own people. '246 Many students are part of global
internet piracy networks and download, burn, and sell motion
pictures. 247 Many have become patriotic and nationalistic in response
to the government's anti-piracy measures. 248 They protest "American
imperialism" and oppose making piracy a public crime. 249 Many
students believe that IPRs are private rights and that violations
2 50
should be treated as civil, not criminal, offenses.
Also, many foreign nations believe that U.S. industries
exaggerate the severity of the piracy problem. 2 51 Taiwan could easily
interpret USTR actions as "carrot and stick" tactics. It could see the
USTR as the representative of intellectual property industries, not an
independent government entity. It could also interpret the USTR's
upgrading and downgrading of Taiwan on the USTR "Special 301"
lists as game playing and disingenuous attempts at being the
intermediary between Taiwanese and U.S. industries. Taiwan could
see this game-playing as futile, in that U.S. industries will never be
satisfied.
2. Weak Domestic Film Industry
Taiwan's weak film industry does not incentivize the prevention
of optical disc piracy. Taiwan has a small local film industry, which

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Lu, supra note 209, at 299.
Id.
Id.
WANG, supra note 12, at 149.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Liu, supra note 112, at 92.

20061

MOTION PICTURE PIRACY IN TAIWAN

creates a strong market and demand for Hollywood films. 252 The
presence of Hollywood films creates a rich content source. 253
Taiwanese film began its worst decline ever in the 1990s, which can
be attributed to increased popularity for Hong Kong films and capital
flight to Hong Kong. 254 Further, the exhibition of Hollywood films
has reduced demand for local films. 255
Locally produced films
dropped from eighty-two per year in 1980 to sixteen in 1999.256 There
were 100 fewer theatres in Taiwan in 1995 than there were in
1990.257 In 1999, 4% of films released in Taiwan were from Taiwan.
In 1998, .4% of total box office revenue was from local films. 258
Ultimately, the Taiwanese film industry collapsed and has only been
slightly counterbalanced by government funding to promote local
259
films.

Further, U.S. film distribution in Taiwan is not facilitated
through local businesses. 260 Unlike practice in other countries, most
major U.S. film companies do not work with local subdistributors or
licensees in Taiwan. 26 1
This may discourage copyright law
improvement and enforcement for three reasons. First, it does not
enable local distributors an opportunity to profit from U.S. films.
Second, without an attached Taiwanese interest, it does not
incentivize a domestic business side push for the copyright protection
of U.S. films. Lastly, it does not bridge the gap between the
Taiwanese people and the conception of capitalistic U.S. businesses.
Psychologically, potential pirates and counterfeit optical disc
purchasers may be less inclined to engage in such acts if they know
they are harming a Taiwanese distributor as opposed to a studio
branch office.
U.S. studios have tried to offset this effect by
employing a "localization" strategy and hiring Taiwanese
262
personnel.
3. Self Interest & WTO Accession
Taiwan's copyright reforms can be construed as a product of selfinterest. Taiwan has long desired WTO membership, which requires
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a nation to comply with TRIPs. 263 To demonstrate that Taiwan could
comply with international standards concerning IPR protection,
Taiwan has increased copyright regulation and enforcement. 264 On
265
January 1, 2002, Taiwan joined the WTO as its 144th member.
Now that this goal has been met, Taiwan may have lost its incentive
to further improve copyright regulation and enforcement.
WTO accession has transformed Taiwan from a politically
isolated country to a member in the global trade arena. Taiwan may
argue that its IPR protection is sufficient in that it complies with the
TRIPs agreement. Taiwan may be hesitant to grant the greater IPR
protection requested by U.S. copyright owners, which include
strengthening border controls, strengthening anti-piracy efforts and
further amending laws. Further, Taiwan may argue that IPR related
concerns should be handled by WTO dispute settlement mechanisms
as opposed to unilateral USTR action under "Special 301."
Taiwan has not always acted in interest of the United States
Taiwan's industry had successfully lobbied for several provisions
contrary to the U.S. industry in the copyright law and in the passage
of the Cable Television Act. 266 Taiwan's reluctance to fully adopt the
Executive Yuan's 2003 amendments to the copyright law is another
example.
C. Recommendation for the Abatement of Optical Disc Piracy in
Taiwan
Effective regulation of optical disc piracy in Taiwan will require
the combination of external and internal pressure. First, the motion
picture industry has a very powerful ally in the USTR and is able to
use U.S. trade power to leverage a legislative and enforcement
structure in which optical disc piracy can be prevented. Taiwan,
however, is also a very strategic ally in Asia, and the United States
should be careful not to exert too much pressure and generate
resentment. Second, the demands of the motion picture industry
stand the highest likelihood of being met when Taiwan has the
internal will to comply. An internal will to protect copyrights within
Taiwan can be encouraged through the local distribution of U.S. film
and public education. Taiwan's recent concessions to the U.S. motion
picture industry in light of WTO accession suggest that the nation is
not entirely averse to further strengthening of its copyright law and
enforcement.
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1. Externally Influencing Structural Change in Taiwan
The support of the USTR allows the motion picture industry to
use the U.S. trade position with Taiwan as a large bargaining chip for
the amendment of the copyright law, increased penalties, and the
creation of enforcement entities to fight optical disc piracy. Although
change in Taiwan has been prompted by the "Special 301" process,
these changes have come about slowly.
Without the USTR, the MPAA, having little leverage alone,
probably would not be able to influence any change in Taiwan.
Taiwan's economic standing or reputation does not hinge on the
opinion of the U.S. motion picture industry. Further, for the most
part, only the motion picture industry is the direct beneficiary of
optical disc piracy enforcement.
On the other hand, Taiwan's
international standing is directly related to its position on the USTR's
"Special 301" lists.
Given the effectiveness of "Special 301" and the correlation
between IIPA and USTR recommendations, the motion picture
industry should continue to influence structural change in Taiwan by
allocating substantial resources to petitioning the USTR in "Special
301" actions. Under "Special 301," interested parties may be able to
influence investigations into a country's IPR practices. The motion
picture industry should continue to support its belief that optical disc
piracy in Taiwan is of significant concern and has worldwide
ramifications with credible research, findings, reports, and
accountings. Further, the motion picture industry should carefully
frame their concerns so that unilateral action under "Special 301" can
be imposed if necessary, bypassing the WTO dispute settlement
procedures.
It is also important that the motion picture industry
demonstrate that optical disc piracy is not only a problem that greatly
affects the motion picture industry but is also a product of a weak
copyright law and enforcement structure, which can hurt other U.S.
industries. At the same time, the motion picture industry should
unite other copyright industries in mutually beneficial goals, such as
intellectual property rights reform, while also demonstrating that the
issue of optical disc piracy takes precedence over other claims by
other copyright industries. To further this goal, the MPAA should
independently petition the USTR in addition to the IIPA petition.
The "Special 301" is not a perfect instrument for immediate and
complete change. The motion picture industry's demands to amend
the copyright law, enforcement structure, and penalty system in
Taiwan may not be realistic. As demonstrated by Taiwan's history, it
has made concessions to the U.S, albeit slowly and sparingly. Given
that Taiwan is a strategic ally in the Pacific, U.S. trade relations are
important and trade leverage must be exerted carefully. Increasing
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threats or imposing trade sanctions in response to Taiwan's "clever
concession" strategy is not advocated as a remedy. The United States
should not appear oppressive, colonial or patriarchal because it may
jeopardize long term relationships and create resentment. Instead,
the motion picture industry may be better off fostering an internal
interest within Taiwan to eliminate optical disc piracy.
2. Breeding Change from Within
The motion picture industry's demands will most likely be met
when it is supported by the Taiwanese constituency. Cultural views
are not static. The motion picture industry can alter traditional
preferences by (a) incentivizing Taiwanese businesses to seek
copyright protection, (b) increasing its public awareness campaign,
and (c) building relationships with domestic organizations that
support IP reform.
a. Incentivizing Taiwanese Businesses
The motion picture industry should place all film distribution in
the hands of local distributors, not studio offices in Taiwan. Ideally,
each studio should contract with a separate local distribution entity
to reduce distributor conflict as to which studio's film the distributor
will promote. That may not be possible, however, because that there
are only a handful of successful film distribution entities in
267
Taiwan.
Nevertheless, there are two notable effects of local distribution.
First, U.S. film distribution will be by Taiwanese businesses, thus
giving U.S. film a Taiwanese face. Pirates or consumers may be less
inclined to conduct an illegal act when they are hurting local
businesses. Second, it gives Taiwanese industries an interest in
copyright protection. The profits of Taiwanese businesses will be
directly hurt by pirates, and therefore, local distributors will be
inclined to join the fight in increasing copyright protection and
enforcement. In addition, these local industries may have local ties
that may be effective in increasing enforcement. Further, given the
strong presence of U.S. film, Taiwan will benefit from increased tax
collection as legitimate optical disc sales increase.
This outcome could be maximized by the deliberate licensing of
different rights (e.g., theatrical, DVD and VCD, or cable) to different
Taiwanese distributors within reason. Because optical disc piracy
affects the entire motion picture schedule, this diversification would
increase the overall pool of newly interested industries that will
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advocate a stronger copyright law and enforcement. It would also
create a system of checks and balances, where one distributor not
only checks the others to see that they are adhering to the motion
picture schedule, but where all businesses may ally together to
discourage and fight piracy.
Given the lack of a Taiwanese film industry, placing distribution
in local business is a practical way to empower and incentivize
Taiwanese business to strengthen copyright law and enforcement.
At least one major U.S. motion picture studio has found it more
advantageous to have local distribution than to set up its own
For
There are signs of successful local distribution.
office. 268
example, Deltamac, a local Taiwanese film distributor has had much
269
Also, local
success, particularly with DVD and VCD distribution.
outlets.2 70
distribution
to
connections
stronger
distributors may have
b. Increased Public Awareness Campaigns
The motion picture industry should employ a public awareness
and education campaign similar to the one in effect in the United
2 71
States The MPAA should extend public service announcements
concerning piracy to Taiwan. The MPAA should include trailers in
all theatrical exhibitions and purchase airtime on major cable and
television channels to inform the Taiwanese public about the moral
and legal implications of piracy. The MPAA should also advertise in
The U.S. public
major Taiwanese magazines and newspapers.
awareness campaign is premised on the loss of U.S. jobs as a result of
piracy, which will have little persuasive value on the Taiwanese
public. Instead, the MPAA's Taiwan campaign can connect piracy to
organized crime, which is responsible for much optical disc piracy and
other illegal activities.
Changing the cultural mindset may be easier with the younger
The MPAA should expand its student education
generation.
program 272 to Taiwan and oversee the incorporation of IPR protection
concepts as part of the government's campaign of "heightened
'2 73
education programs.
The MPAA should continue to schedule demonstrations and
protests to further remind the public of the need to respect
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Announcement as Part of the Nationwide Awareness Campaign on the Impact Digital
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copyrights. Like the MPAA has done in the past, 274 it should enlist
the aid of local Taiwanese actors, artists, exhibitors, distributors, and
retailers, which will grow in number as Taiwan further develops.
c.

Building Relationships with Governmental and Independent IP
Organizations

The substantial revenue loss derived from counterfeit optical
discs has made optical disc piracy a major issue on the MPAA, IIPA
and USTR agenda. This is demonstrated by significant reference to
optical disc piracy in IIPA recommendations to the USTR, and its
subsequent incorporation in USTR "Special 301" reports.
There may come a time, however, when optical disc piracy may
no longer be at the forefront of IPR protection in Taiwan. Time and
technology may create substantial losses in other intellectual
property areas, such as internet piracy. Time and technology may
make optical discs obsolete, much like the VHS format.
There may also come a time when the USTR ceases to be the
voice of the motion picture industry in Taiwan. Recently, although
the USTR has agreed with the IIPA's "Special 301" recommendation
for Taiwan, the USTR failed to adopt any of the IIPA's numerous
recommendations to reduce optical disc piracy, which suggests that
the USTR is satisfied with the current infrastructure in place to fight
optical disc piracy. The USTR may no longer feel the need to
pressure Taiwan to further reduce optical piracy. If the USTR
reports continue to be silent towards the optical disc piracy problem
in Taiwan, the motion picture industry should divert resources
towards further building relationships and allying with lobby
government entities, organizations, and officials responsible for IP
protection within Taiwan, such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
The motion picture industry should complement its push for
structural change in Taiwan with continued enforcement actions.
The motion picture industry should continue to initiate investigations
and raids, and continue working with local law enforcement. The
motion picture industry can benefit greatly from this. Cooperation
may create unity and camaraderie between Taiwanese law
enforcement officials. Also, enforcement actions will conserve the
resources of the Taiwanese law enforcement. More importantly, it
will contribute to stronger enforcement. Further, such participation
demonstrates the motion picture industry's seriousness and
commitment to its anti-piracy campaign.

274.

WANG, supra note 12, at 140.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Optical disc piracy in Taiwan reduces worldwide revenues made
through the motion picture release schedule. Counterfeit optical
discs from Taiwan containing U.S. motion pictures are found all over
the world. In the United States, most counterfeit optical discs seized
were from Taiwan. The motion picture industry deals with this
problem by encouraging the strengthening of copyright law and
enforcement in Taiwan. The MPAA's international arm maintains
an office in Taiwan and helps in the enforcement of the copyright law.
Also, the MPAA has been able to enlist the aid of USTR in using the
U.S. trade position with Taiwan to achieve these goals under "Special
301."
Taiwan has slowly and sparingly strengthened copyright
legislation and enforcement. Taiwan's hesitation can be seen as the
result of being pulled by two often opposing forces-the interests of
U.S. copyright industry and its own self interest. On one side,
Taiwan is dependent on U.S. trade and values its international
reputation. However, Taiwan's cultural history, limited resources,
economic status, and lack of copyright industry, in contrast to the
United States, do not support strong copyright law and enforcement.
To achieve its goal, the motion picture industry must find a way
to effectively use U.S. trade leverage and create self-interest within
Taiwan. Therefore, the MPAA should avoid encouraging overly
forceful "Special 301" recommendations to the USTR. It also should
inspire copyright protection within Taiwan by demonstrating that
stronger protection can benefit Taiwanese industries and by
educating the Taiwanese public.
If there is no change to the
copyright law and annual losses related to piracy remain the same,
Taiwan can expect to remain on the USTR's "Special 301" lists.
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